Hong Kong’s past 20 years – promises and realities

After Hong Kong’s handover in 1997, in line with the policy of “One Country, Two Systems”, China was committed to non-intervention and acted accordingly. As years are passing by, however, it seems to be forgotten, and Beijing is assuming an increasingly stringent control over the former British colony. Hong Kong is also bursting of a myriad of internal problems, and is under pressure from above, China’s leadership.   It would be task of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong to ease these situations, but she is lacking public support. The situation is escalating and requires urgent solution.

A British colony

Hong Kong’s history dates back to ancient times, but the significance of the city started to increase from the 1800s. Major powers, especially Britain, wanted to assert their commercial interests against enclosed China, by – among others – opening ports. In those days China was focussing mainly on exports, which resulted in a tremendous amount of silver flowing into the country, as Europe paid silver for Chinese goods. In order to prevent this and to replace silver, he East India Company started to ship opium to China. This triggered a crisis of the Chinese economy, as opium spread so widely and became so highly demanded that silver started to flow out of China.

The Chinese court banned opium imports and several thousands of tons of load was seized and destroyed. As a response, the British sent a fleet to make the Chinese court compensate them for the losses, and thus the first Opium War broke out, and the century of “humiliation” began.[i] The Chinese emperor’s court, believed to be invulnerable, suffered a heavy defeat against modern British weapons, and was forced to make humiliating peace. On 29^th August, 1842 the Treaty of Nanking was signed, later followed by the supplementary Treaty of the Bogue, in the terms of which China ceded Hong Kong Island, opened five of its ports to British traders, paid a high amount of reparations and acknowledged the extraterritoriality of the British.[ii]

The main aim of Britain was to guarantee its own commercial interests, which was accomplished thereby and, as a result, Hong Kong’s significance started to increase. Under the Convention of Peking, concluded in 1860, after the second Opium War, Britain assumed control also over the Kowloon Peninsula located opposite Hong Kong Island.[iii] Eventually in 1898, with its power waning, China leased the “New Territories” to Britain for 99 years, shaping the territory of present-day Hong Kong.[iv] During World War II, the city was occupied by the Japanese, and after the peace treaty was concluded, British rule resumed.

Its economic and commercial significance increased greatly after 1949.[v] The People’s republic of China, led by the Chinese Communist Party, enclosed and turned away from the world, and Hong Kong was the “channel” to conduct most of its foreign trade, import technology and gain information about the external world. This helped Hong Kong become one of the world’s most significant commercial, financial and economic centres.[vi]

One country, two systems

Deng Xiaoping, having returned to power in 1977, regarded the resumption of exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao and create the unity of the country, failed by Mao, as his main goals. As a result, the concept of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy, an important element of socialism with Chinese characteristics, was born in the 1980s.[vii] This guiding principle regards national unity as the most important priority, which is explained by the following reasons. First, the fundamental national interest is highlighted: Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao issues are all of historical origins and belong to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and there is no room for compromise. Second, nationalist sentiments are emphasised: it is the people’s common desire that China should be reunified with these territories, this is the reason why the Chinese government firmly pushes forward with the tremendous efforts for national reunification and proposed the innovative notion of “One Country, Two Systems”. Third, national revival: only by achieving complete national reunification, can China completely eliminate underlying threat to national sovereignty and territorial integrity, truly unite the Chinese nation as a whole and create national glory.[viii]

Thus Deng Xiaoping was right when he recognised that Hong Kong’s prosperity and capitalism could mean an advantage for China.  He could see modernisation in it, which would be beneficial for China in terms of finance, economy and governance.   The lease of the “New Territories” was about to run out, and it was inevitable to arrange for British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping to meet and discuss the future of Hong Kong in Beijing in 1982.  On the previous day, the British head of government met the CCP’s  Secretary General, Zhao Ziyang, who highlighted two important viewpoints about the fate of the city: sovereignty, and the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, but he pointed out that if it came to a choice between the two, China would put sovereignty above prosperity and stability.[ix] Hong Kong’s political elite reflected to the British government that they would like an arrangement in which Beijing would allow the British to continue governing Hong Kong as a caretaker administration. They were also of the view that it was not viable for the Hong Kong Island and Kowloon peninsula to stand alone if the New Territories were to be returned to China, ripping the city into two. Deng made it clear that China wanted full sovereignty and this was not for discussion, and also warned that if the two sides could not reach agreement for the transition within two years, China would declare its policy unilaterally.[x]

After several rounds of talks, a Joint Declaration was signed in December 1984, stipulating that Hong Kong would become a Special Administrative Region of China, and not only the “New Territories”, but also Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula returned to China on 1^st July, 1997, under “One Country, Two Systems”. This system was first created for regaining Taiwan, but unification has not been achieved ever since.[xi] Hong Kong was not involved in the agreement, as it was made between Britain and China. Under the agreement, Hong Kong’s current social and economic systems as well as the people’s lifestyle would remain unchanged for 50 years after the handover. Rights and freedoms such as of speech, press and assembly would be insured by law.[xii]

Thus the Basic Law, also adopted by the Chinese National People’s Congress, authorises Hong Kong to exercise a relatively high degree of autonomy, as it enjoys executive, legislative and independent judicial power, that is, its legislation may differ from China’s. However, China is responsible for defence and foreign affairs.[xiii] Residents of the city wanted to ensure that the Chief Executive and legislative councillors would be elected democratically, but Beijing did not let this right out of its hands.[xiv] In 1992, Britain appointed Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong, who was entrusted with the task of preparing the city and lay the fundamentals of its democratic future after Chinese take-over.

Beijing was celebrating the handover at Tiananmen Square, with the official ceremony being broadcast on giant screens. The ceremony in Hong Kong was attended Prince Charles, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and Hong Kong’s leaving governor, Chris Patten. China was represented by – among others – President Jiang Zemin, Prime Minister Li Peng and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. During the event, Chinese soldiers crossed the border, and China re-took possession of Hong Kong ripped off several years before.[xv] Deng Xiaoping could not live until one of his greatest goals was achieved, as he had deceased just couple of months before the handover.[xvi]

Governance and identity

After the Joint Declaration had been made, the task of drafting the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-Constitution, began, involving 36 professional from mainland China and 23 from the city of Hong Kong.[xvii] The pro-democracy members of the drafting committee tried but failed to ensure that the Chief Executive and legislative councillors would be elected democratically. As a measure of how far apart Beijing and Hong Kong were, those in Hong Kong who wanted full democracy felt the Basic Law betrayed the city’s people, while the Chinese thought the city was granted far greater autonomy than any Western government would have done for any local area under its rule.[xviii]

The administration, established under British colonial rule and long held responsible for the success story of the city, has now become obsolete and ineffective. The failure of governance can be diagnosed with respect to systemic defects, decline of state capacity, and the crisis of social cohesion.[xix] Some experts point out that the relationships between the executive, legislature and the bureaucracy   a today are uncoordinated, poorly developed, and often dysfunctional. With a system neither parliamentary fish nor presidential fowl, the executive, the bureaucracy and the legislature each pursue their own agendas punctuated by occasional skirmishes on the boundaries of their domains and by attempts to extend their jurisdiction on the detriment of the others.[xx] Colonial logic no longer worked after 1997 when the general public expected the government to be accountable for their actions. After returning to China, in the absence of universal suffrage of electing the Chief Executive and the Legco, it was difficult to gain enough political trust from the public as they do not have a sense of accountability.[xxi] Hong Kong has come to a stage where a political culture of distrust is building up at a time when political trust is much needed for the different institutions to cooperate, and for enabling the government to lead society in major policy innovations and reforms.[xxii]

On the surface, there was supposed to be no change in Hong Kong’s policymaking architecture after the handover. In practice, however, the actors occupying that inherited architecture, and their interests and thinking, and both the internal and external habitats, had all undergone subtle but significant changes, producing a highly differentiated polity for government.[xxiii] The former Hong Kong colony was an administrative state, with government by the bureaucrats under the rule of the British governor., supported by business and professional elites. Such administrative state became no longer sustainable after the handover, mainly because of the lack of cooperation between the executive and the legislature to help forge policy consensus based on agreements. Efforts to rebuild strong governance rely mostly on the bureaucracy and advisory committees, but in the absence of adequate institutional links, the overall system remains disjointed. As society becomes more differentiated and politicized, sometimes not just over conflicts in interests but also in values, and as new civil society activism emerges and escalates, the existing political base, together with the elites, proves insufficient to carry the public view and confer policy legitimacy.[xxiv]

Hong Kong’s society has been suffering from a crisis, especially in seeking a shared sense of common identity or fate.  This crisis is a combined result of the lack of social cohesion, an economic crisis of production and a political crisis of representation.[xxv] Old social and policy assumptions are no longer valid. Instead there is a widespread disarray in public sentiments and growing fragmentation of an originally fragile society cemented largely by economic success in the past.[xxvi] The Hong Kong identity had grown out of being different from and, as the city-dwellers felt, superior to mainland China – its economic success, relatively more freedoms and liberties, rule of law, and political pluralisms.[xxvii]

After 1997, such a Hong Kong identity has been called into question.  Instead of leading China’s economic development, Hong Kong now turns around to the mainland for economic support.  The political environment has changes after the handover, and the government has to respond to increased demands from various sectors for assistance, intervention and regulation. More critically, rapid globalisation has brought about a new international economic environment, which no longer favours small-scale, export-dependent economies like Hong Kong.[xxviii] The 1998 Asian financial crisis is the dividing line, since when Hong Kong has to map its developmental path within the context of a fast-growing Chinese economy, which necessitates economic rethinking and restructuring, in which the government should play an important role. [xxix] Decolonisation has only just begun for Hong Kong, and it entails both a process of national reunification and identification with China. The difficulty lies in the fact that two societies with distinct cultural identities have to reconstruct a common identity along the “One Country, Two Systems” policy, embracing the British colonial past of the people of Hong Kong, which has allowed them to develop an almost self-sufficient economic, legal and political identification.[xxx]

The anxieties and conflicts emanating from the cognitive gap between the mainland and Hong Kong community are as much a result of institutional differences as an outgrowth of decoupled cultural identities.[xxxi] Most Hong Kong citizens want to be proud of being Hong Kong permanent presidents not just because they are economically more affluent or materially better endowed. Their pride ultimately lies in an institutional edge as represented by political pluralism, the rule of law, respect for human rights and civil liberties, accountable governance and democratic institutions. The advent of globalisation and the rise of China are together rewriting the script for Hong Kong in the new century.[xxxii]

20 years after the handover

It was obvious that in the early years of the handover, Beijing largely adopted a position of non-intervention in Hong Kong and allowed the HKSAR government to govern Hong Kong on its own, particularly from 1997 to 2003, under the first term of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa.[xxxiii] China successfully built confidence in the “One Country, Two Systems” policy within the local population and the international community, effectively side-lining potential centre-periphery conflicts between Beijing and Hong Kong. Nevertheless, 2003 was a turning point and the conflict started to escalate. On July 1, 2003, the government’s plan to legislate on Article 23 of the Basic Law, outlawing any acts deemed to threaten national security, sparked a mass protest. The law has been widely viewed by most Hong Kongers as a way for the communist Chinese government to assert its own interpretation of issues, allowing Beijing a political foothold in and total control over the city.[xxxiv]

After 2003 Beijing decided to change its policy with regard to Hong Kong. Beijing has determined to bring Hong Kong under direct supervision from the central government.  From a political perspective, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) was to re-interpret the provisions of the Basic Law to control the pace and scope of Hong Kong’s democratic reforms. Second, Beijing strengthened the role of the central government’s Liaison Office as the “second governing team” in the HKSAR to direct the domestic political affairs of Hong Kong on the spot, such as coordinating the campaigns of pro-Beijing elites at different levels, from District Council to Legislative Council.[xxxv]

Economically, through the conclusion of various cross-border economic and regional cooperation agreements between the city and China, Hong Kong has been brought under Beijing’s economic control without raising suspicion roughly over a decade of economic integration.[xxxvi] Ideologically, Beijing has promoted a single Chinese national identity throughout schools in Hong Kong. Nurturing a Chinese national identity has been adopted as one of the official learning goals for Hong Kong’s primary and secondary education, which is to be achieved through various subjects such as Chinese language, Chinese history, as well as mainland study tours and internships.[xxxvii] Clearly, all these efforts represent Beijing’s attempts to foster Hong Kongers’ loyalty to the centre and to promote ideological homogeneity across the whole country.

The year 2017 was a very significant period for the city, as the new Chief Executive was elected in March, who, with her new cabinet, was inaugurated on 1^st July, a day also marking the 30^th anniversary of the handover.  China’s President Xi Jinping also attended the event during a 3-day visit.[xxxviii] The reunification of the Chinese nation is a key part of the “Chinese Dream” policy, announced by the Chinese President, in which Hong Kong also has an important role.[xxxix] His visit and his participation in the ceremony was a signal towards domestic politics and the Chinese people to prove that  the situation was under Xi Jinping’s control and he was reassuring everyone that  Hong Kong forms a part of China, legitimising his own power and the Chinese Communist Party, as the 19^th Party Congress was to be held in October.  For the people of Hong Kong, however, the situation is not so obvious., especially the young generation, who are suffering from an identity crisis and struggling with social problems, including housing in particular. Therefore, protests were organised for the day of the ceremony and Xi Jinping’s visit to express their disagreement.

In his speech delivered at the handover and inauguration ceremony, Chinese President Xi Jinping has warned Hong Kongers not to cross the “red line” of China’s sovereignty and the power of the Communist Party.[xl] Earlier, China’s No 3 state leader and the head of the National People’s Congress Zhang Dejiang had announced Beijing’s plans to tighten grip on Hong Kong and said, ‘The relationship between the central government and Hong Kong is that of delegation of power, not power-sharing.’[xli]

Chinese President Xi Jinping has also delivered his message on how Hong Kong could move forward under “One Country, Two Systems”. 1 To have a correct understanding of the relationship between “One Country” and “Two Systems”, to correctly handle the relationship between the HKSAR and the central government. 2 To always act in accordance with the Chinese constitution and the Basic Law of Hong Kong. 3 To always focus on development as the top priority to foster future growth. 4 To always maintain a harmonious and stable social environment. Furthermore, he also explained that making everything political or deliberately creating differences and provoking confrontation would not resolve the problems, it can only severely hinder Hong Kong’s economic and social development. Finally, he added that they are ready to talk to anyone who loves Hong Kong, and genuinely supports the principle of “One Country, Two Systems”, and the Basic Law, no matter what political views or position they may hold.[xlii]

20^th anniversary, in addition to a ceremony and the visit of China’s President, also coincides with the inauguration of the first female Chief Executive. She is facing the difficult task of easing the growing tension in the relationship between Hong Kong and Beijing, and to find a compromise mutually acceptable for both sides. In her inaugural speech, Lam vowed to repay the trust and support of the people and the central government’s support with diligence and achievements. [xliii] She promised to accurately and comprehensively fulfil her duties as chief executive, and to resolutely do everything within her ability to implement the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, uphold the Basic Law, defend the rule of law, and promote a deep and positive relationship between the central government and the Hong Kong SAR. She vowed in front of the guests, including Xi Jinping, that she would firmly take actions in accordance with the law against any acts that will undermine China’s sovereignty, security and development interests”.[xliv] Thus, there is enormous pressure on the new Chief Executive, inclined more towards China than democratic Hong Kong. For the present, she is under more pressure from above, the central government than from below, the society of Hong Kong, which, however, could change later.

In order to prevent this change from happening, the largest military parade since the UK handed the city back to China in 1997 was organised during the visit of the Chinese President. A couple of days later, China’s first aircraft carrier entered Hong Kong’s waters.[xlv] On Beijing’s behalf, it was not just a demonstration of military power and a show of martial might but also an unsubtle message that if there were any mass protests threatening China’s sovereignty and interests, Beijing would not hesitate to call upon the army.

Conclusion

In the 1980s, Hong Kong took pride in that mainland China had to rely on Hong Kong for economic development and modernisation, and the city was held as a growth model for the rest of China.  Nowadays, after nearly three decades of economic reform and opening-up, China no longer needs Hong Kong so much. The relationship seems to be even turning around, with Hong Kong increasingly becoming dependent on the mainland market. The Basic Law has provided safeguards to the coexistence of “Two Systems” within “One Country”, and ensures a high degree of autonomy, it has limited say in the national policymaking process.

British colonial rule and institutionalisation had given the city a great opportunity to develop and modernise without being affected by Maoist influence. Now Hong Kong cannot continue to thrive on such an insular position. Hanging onto the past formula of success may hinder it from seeing new perspectives and new opportunities.  With the legacy of the colonial rule, it is ill-equipped to face new challenges. At the moment, Hong Kong has yet to find constitutional, institutional and political answers to its myriad of governance problems.  These important changes, however, call for strong governance, which is barely supported and highly distrusted if it lacks legitimacy.

Thus, the most daunting task facing Hong Kong is to rebuild trust in governance, which could steer the economy and the society forward and redefine the identity and the future of the city. This is the only way to implement necessary changes, as it has no economic power to be able to either compete with China or assert its interests.

These internal problems are regarded as obviously dangerous by China’s leadership and are believed to be attempts to break away Hong Kong from the country. Therefore, after the initial lenient policy, Beijing has been seeking to tighten relationships with Hong Kong and gain as much influence as possible in the city since the early 2000s.  Since the presidency of Xi Jinping, it has taken an unsubtle form, and the new Chief Executive, loyal to Beijing, seems to be a partner. In the ever-tensing situation the crucial question is how Hong Kong’s society will react to these issues, whether they will resist or China’s show of military power will be sufficient for their resignation. One thing is sure: whatever path is chosen, the response given to it will create a new, common identity in the people of Hong Kong suffering from an identity crisis now.

Author: Alexandra Zoltai

List of sources

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• ’Deng Xiaoping shengping jianjie邓小平生平简介。[Deng Xiaoping élete]’ In: Renminwang人民网, 2004年07月12日. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/69113/69682/4723366.html
• Bland, Ben – Anderlini, Jamil: Xi warns Hong Kong not to threaten ’red line’ of Chinese rule. In: The Financial Times, 2017. július 1. https://www.ft.com/content/024b9ddc-5e14-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b (utolsó letöltés: 2017. július 15.)
• Bland, Ben: Xi Jinping’s Chinese dream encounters reality check in Hong Kong. In: The Financial Times, 2017. július 4. https://www.ft.com/content/d8b3c952-609f-11e7-91a7-502f7ee26895 (utolsó letöltés: 2017. július 15.)
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• Fong, Brian C. H.: Hong Kong’s Make-or-Break Moment. The Diplomat Issue 32, 2017 július. (utolsó letöltés: 2017. július 14.)
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Notes

[i] Goh Sui Noi: Hong Kong handover: ’One country, two systems’ shaky two decades later. In: Straits Times, 2017. június 11.

[ii] Kissinger, Henry: Kínáról. 2014. 68.

[iii] Rodrigues, Jason: Hong Kong handover: timeline.  In: The Guardian, 2017. július 1.

[iv] Griffiths, James: The secret negotiations that sealed Hong Kong’s future. In: CNN, 2017. június 22.

[v] Goh Sui Noi: Hong Kong handover: ’One country, two systems’ shaky two decades later. In: Straits Times, 2017. június 11.

[vi] Rodrigues, Jason: Hong Kong handover: timeline.  In: The Guardian, 2017. július 1.

[vii] Leng Tiexun: On the Fundamental Characteristics of the „One Country, Two Systems” Policy. In: Academic Journal of „One Country, Two Systems” Vol. I, 49 – 59.

[viii] Leng Tiexun: On the Fundamental Characteristics of the „One Country, Two Systems” Policy. In: Academic Journal of „One Country, Two Systems” Vol. I, 50.

[ix] Griffiths, James: The secret negotiations that sealed Hong Kong’s future. In: CNN, 2017. június 22.

[x] Goh Sui Noi: Hong Kong handover: ’One country, two systems’ shaky two decades later. In: Straits Times, 2017. június 11.

[xi] Goh Sui Noi: Hong Kong handover: ’One country, two systems’ shaky two decades later. In: Straits Times, 2017. június 11.

[xii] Goh Sui Noi: Hong Kong handover: ’One country, two systems’ shaky two decades later. In: Straits Times, 2017. június 11.

[xiii] ’Has „one country, two systems” been a success for Hong Kong?” In: The Economist, 2017. június 29.

[xiv] Goh Sui Noi: Hong Kong handover: ’One country, two systems’ shaky two decades later. In: Straits Times, 2017. június 11.

[xv] Vines, Stephen: We’ll never forget you, Britain told Hong Kong with a straight face. In: South China Morning Post, 2017. július 2.

[xvi] ’Deng Xiaoping shengping jianjie邓小平生平简介。[Deng Xiaoping élete]’ In: Renminwang人民网, 2004年07月12日.

[xvii] Goh Sui Noi: Hong Kong handover: ’One country, two systems’ shaky two decades later. In: Straits Times, 2017. június 11.

[xviii] Goh Sui Noi: Hong Kong handover: ’One country, two systems’ shaky two decades later. In: Straits Times, 2017. június 11.

[xix] Cheung, B. L.: Governance in Hong Kong: In Search of Identity, Legitimacy and Trust. In: The Hong Kong Institute of Education, 2009. p. 2.

[xx] Cheung 2009:2.

[xxi] Cheung 2009:5.

[xxii] Cheung 2009:3.

[xxiii] Cheung 2009:3.

[xxiv] Cheung 2009:6.

[xxv] Cheung 2009:17.

[xxvi] Cheung 2009:17.

[xxvii] Cheung 2009:21.

[xxviii] Cheung 2009:14.

[xxix] Cheung 2009:14.

[xxx] Cheung 2009:22.

[xxxi] Cheung 2009:22.

[xxxii] Cheung 2009:23.

[xxxiii] Fong, Brian C. H.: Hong Kong’s Make-or-Break Moment. The Diplomat Issue 32, 2017 július.

[xxxiv] Wong, Cal: China Commemorates Hong Kong’ Basic Law by Restricting It. In: The Diplomat, 2017. május 30.

[xxxv] Fong, Brian C. H.: Hong Kong’s Make-or-Break Moment. The Diplomat Issue 32, 2017 július.

[xxxvi] Fong, Brian C. H.: Hong Kong’s Make-or-Break Moment. The Diplomat Issue 32, 2017 július.

[xxxvii] Fong, Brian C. H.: Hong Kong’s Make-or-Break Moment. The Diplomat Issue 32, 2017 július.

[xxxviii] Bland, Ben – Anderlini, Jamil: Xi warns Hong Kong not to threaten ’red line’ of Chinese rule. In: The Financial Times, 2017. július 1.

[xxxix] Bland, Ben: Xi Jinping’s Chinese dream encounters reality check in Hong Kong. In: The Financial Times, 2017. július 4.

[xl] Bland, Ben – Anderlini, Jamil: Xi warns Hong Kong not to threaten ’red line’ of Chinese rule. In: The Financial Times, 2017. július 1.

[xli] Lau, Stuart: Chinese state leader Zhang Dejiang announces Beijing’s plans to tighten grip on Hong Kong. In? South China Morning Post, 2017. május 27.

[xlii] Ng, Joyce: President Xi Jinping’s four key points for moving forward under ’one country, two systems’. In: South China Morning Post, 2017. július 1.

[xliii] Lau, Stuart – Ng, Joyce – Lam, Jeffie – Cheung, Tony: Hong Kong’s first female chief executive Carrie Lam sworn in by President Xi Jinping, as city marks 20 years since handover. In. South China Morning Post, 2017. július 1.

[xliv] Lau, Stuart – Ng, Joyce – Lam, Jeffie – Cheung, Tony: Hong Kong’s first female chief executive Carrie Lam sworn in by President Xi Jinping, as city marks 20 years since handover. In. South China Morning Post, 2017. július 1.

[xlv] Haas, Benjamin: Chinese aircraft carrier sails into Hong Kong in Show of naval power. In: The Guardian. 2017. július 7.