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China’s “debt trap diplomacy” in Africa: false accusation or reality?

Czirják Ráhel 9660 Views 0 Comments , , , ,

China’s growing influence on the African continent has met with sharp criticism, primarily from the West, claiming that the Asian country causes Africa to run into debt. This is undoubtedly grounded on the fact that Africa’s external debt is increasing again. The question is, however, which underlying trends are responsible for this. Is it true that China pursues a “debt trap diplomacy” vis-à-vis Africa? This paper aims to examine the criticism against China by answering the questions above.

The “debt trap diplomacy”[1], increasingly used in the media, expert comments and analyses, refers to the phenomenon that China grants big sums of development loans to developing countries, which, over time, become incapable to repay their loans. In exchange for easing the debt burden, China demands concessions or other benefits[2] securing economic gains, thereby increasing its overall influence in a given country.

One of the important elements of the discussion accusing China of “debt trap diplomacy” is the current increase of the African debt stock: the credit-to-GDP ratio exceeds 50% in the continent and 16 states are facing debt repayment difficulties – in some cases, repayment has become impossible, which makes immediate intervention necessary.[3] Several exerts compare the situation to the debt crisis of the 1980-90s.[4] The other pillar of the argument is that China has now become the primary bilateral creditor to Africa.[5]

All this leads to the conclusion that the Asian country aims to increase its political and economic influence on the black continent by making the African economy insolvent through huge loans, which, being in a vulnerable position, has no choice but to meet the Chinese demands – even if those violate its countries’ sovereignty. The present study intends to answer the question by exploring the situation as to whether China’s “debt trap diplomacy” is a reality or only the concerns over the shifting balance of power generate the discussion among the big powers traditionally dominant in the region. To find out, the study first describes the status quo and how the African credit volume has evolved over the past years, exploring China’s role in it as well. It also briefly touches upon the debt crises before the turn of the millennium, comparing the similarities and differences between the crises and the current situation as well as examining the possible conclusions that can be drawn from the past. Finally, it explores the causes of the African credit growth and, based on the conclusions, provides an answer to the main question.

Status quo

According to Word Bank data, the African loan volume reached its lowest level since the turn of the millennium in 2006 (approx. USD 200 bn), the main reason for which was the cancellation of debts addressed in detail in the next chapter. Then from 2008, at USD 227.6 bn, it started to dramatically rise. According to the most recent figures, the total external debt of the continent was 535 bn in 2017, which is a 15.5% growth compared to the previous year.[6]

Figure 1 shows the evolution of the continent’s credit volume from 1970 until today. It is well illustrated that today’s credit volume is higher than ever since the liberation from the colonial rule, including the debt crises of the 1980s and 1990s. Absolute values, however, can be misleading. Absolute values, however, can be misleading.

Figure 1. External debt of sub-Saharan Africa (1970-2017, billion USD at today’s rate)[7]

Since if we consider how much of the total global external debt this amount accounts for, the situation is by far not as worrying. The debt stock at USD 535 bn only represents as little as 1.5% of the total debt, which was USD 35,880 bn in 2017 – based on the most recently available Word Bank data.[8] Furthermore, in a regional breakdown it can be concluded that the debt stock of sub-Saharan Africa is the second lowest in the world following the Middle Eastern and North African region, while Europe and Asia have the highest debt level, reaching nearly USD 1600 bn in 2017.[9]

Figure 2. External debt of the world’s regions (2008-2017, USD billion)[10]

We can get a realistic perspective on the extent of the credit volume by comparing it to the performance of the economies in question, for instance, in terms of their GDP. Since it is the size of the economy that determines how great a (debt) burden is that a country can still manage. This suggests that the debt-to-GDP median ratio of Africa had a decreasing trend from the turn of the millennium until 2011, when it stood at 30%.[11] However, this direction took a turn and the ratio increased from 37% to 56%[12] between 2012 and 2016 or, according to other sources, it rose to 53%[13] in 2017.

Within the continental average, significant disparities can be observed on national level: this ratio is below 40%[14] in 16 countries such as Botswana and Mali, above 60%[15] in Angola, Kenya, Gabon, and Mauritius and even exceeds 100% in 6 countries, including Cape Verde, the Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Mozambique, and Sudan.[16]

IMF guidelines can help in determining whether the credit-to-GDP ratio is high or low. The Fund sets the threshold at 40% for low-income countries, below which the chance of a debt crises is 2-5% due to the debt-to-GDP ratio, while, above this level, the probability of loans becoming unmanageable is 15-20%.[17] (So the 40% threshold does not apply to Mauritius, which has an upper-middle income and the lower-middle-income Cape Verde.[18])

The 40% threshold might not seem too high compared to international standards, it really is for African economies since these countries collect relatively little tax – in Africa, the rate of the collected tax to the GDP is 17% while properly financing developments would require at least 25%[19] – and pay high interest rates for loans. In other words, they cannot afford to have such a high level of indebtedness as developed economies do[20] where the rate can exceed 100%.

In late 2017, Chad, Eritrea, Mozambique, the Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe faced debt repayment difficulties, while Zambia and Ethiopia was rated by the IMF as countries with high risk of debt distress.[21] The organisation’s analyses of April 2018 show that at least 40% of the continent’s low-income countries are having debt repayment difficulties or are subject to a high risk.[22]

Nevertheless, it is true that in the majority of the countries the loan rates do not exceed the level before 2005[23] when the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank cancelled the debt of 30 African states through the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) initiative.[24] 60% of the states have a low risk of insolvency, therefore, according to the latest analysis of the African Development Bank (2019) the continent is not threatened by a debt crisis despite its credit growth.[25] The evolution of the debts before and after the HIPC initiative as a share of the GDP is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. External debt as a share of GDP before and after the HIPC initiative[26]

It is worth examining the debt stock also based on the source of loan. Loans can be divided by creditors into two major groups: loans from official and private creditors. The latter includes commercial banks and issuers of bonds, that is market stakeholders. In the case of official creditors, we distinguish multilateral and bilateral loans. By the former, loans from international financial intuitions, such as the World Bank, regional development banks and other multilateral and intergovernmental agencies are meant. Bilateral loans, on the other hand, are disbursed by governments and their organisations, such as central banks, state aid organisations, and ministries. [27]

In recent years, there has been a shift from official and foreign concessional loans towards commercial loans in the African credit stock.[28] While in the years before the new millennium (1995-1999), the rate of publicly guaranteed private loans in the total credit stock in Africa stood at 14.6%[29], it has increased to 32%[30] to date. This entails a more risky credit environment since the loans from market participants have higher debt service costs than concessional loans, for example by multilateral actors.

Within official loans, the share of loans by multilateral actors do not show significant differences from the late 90s: the rate was 36.9% between 1995 and 1999[31] and, based on estimates by the Jubilee Debt Campaign, 36% in 2018[32]. In contrast, the share of bilateral loans in the time period studied dropped by more than 10 percentage points: from 43.2%[33] to 32%[34]. This fact is attributable to the increase of the share of private loans.

Figure 4. Distribution of the African external debt stock by creditors[35]

A significant shift, however, is observed with respect to bilateral donors since the influence of traditional creditors, such as Europe and the USA, has declined while the share of emerging countries has increased.[36] At the top of these is China whose share of Africa’s total external credit is 18-26%[37] or 14% according to other sources[38], while the share of the Paris Club which comprises developed countries is estimated at 10%.[39] As for multilateral actors, the current share of the IMF and the World Bank is valued at 4-5% and 16% respectively.[40]

Based on the above, certain sources have come to the conclusion that China have now become Africa’s number on creditor.[41] Based on the estimated data, the Asian country really is Africa’s greatest bilateral creditor and its share of the continent’s total debt is significant. If we consider all the lenders, that is both multilateral institutions and bilateral actors, it can be established that the influence of the World Bank – as one of the most important institution among traditional creditor – is still considerable and, according to certain sources, even greater than that of China. When making such a comparison, however, we have to point out that China grants almost as much credit to Africa as the multilateral organisation which is financed by more than 50 states. Considering all of these factors and taking into account the uncertainty of estimates, the present paper states that China has now become one of the primary creditors of the black continent.

However, within the continental average, there are again significant disparities. The estimates of the China-Africa Research Initiative, John Hopkins University, show that the largest Chinese loans flowed into Angola (USD 42.8 bn), Ethiopia (USD 13.7 bn), and Kenya (USD 9.8 bn) between 2000 and 2017.[42] However, in Kenya for instance, the greatest creditor is still the World Bank.[43] There are several African countries where the amounts of credit were much lower in the period under examination – for example, Guinea, Rwanda, and Liberia respectively borrowed USD 646 mn, 288 mn, and 50 mn from China whereas 9 countries, including Gambia, Burkina Faso, and Eswatini did not take out any loans.[44]

All of the above data suggest that although the African credit stock has significantly increased over the past years, the rate of this increase varies greatly in the states. The credit-to-GDP ratio of the continent is still not even close to the debt level 2 or 3 decades ago, however, it did exceed the 40% threshold identified by the IMF. It is also clear that although China has secured a considerate share of the African credit stock over the past years, it is by far not the only creditor in the continent, the traditional Western actors continue to play a dominant role. Thus, the view that China is solely responsible for the indebtedness of Africa can be refuted. It is also important to note that the expert opinions about the extent of the risk of a debt crisis differ: while certain analysts fear of a new debt crisis evolving, other assessments suggest that there is no threat even with the current credit growth.[45] Based on the above, the claim that China makes the black continent indebted seems to be an oversimplified narrative. The issue of the debt trap also covers other aspects, which will be dealt with in the next chapter. Since the current situation is compared by many to the debt crisis at the end of the past century, first we will examine this parallel in more detail.

Does history repeat itself?

From the late 1960s and early 1970s, the newly independent African countries began to build the social and physical infrastructure that was necessary for the proper functioning of the economy. The growing public expenditure was covered partly by revenues from exported raw material – the world market price of which significantly rose in the early ‘70s – and partly by loans.[46] Moreover, the terms of taking out a loan were very favourable in the beginning since, due to the oil crises of 1973 and ‘79, the petroleum exporting countries accumulated a significant amount of USD revenues which flowed into commercial banks and appeared in the international market as cheap and easily accessible loans.

However, when the Western financial institutions raised their interest rates in order to manage the inflation caused by the petroleum price explosion, the debt burden of the black continent and other borrower countries increased sharply[47]. Furthermore, the world market prices of raw materials began to drop dramatically, thus, the state revenues significantly declined. As a consequence, the ongoing and still vital investments required taking out new loans.[48] Thus, the debt stock of the developing world rose from UD 300 bn to 1500 bn between the 1970s and the 1990s. In the poorest countries, including many African states, the debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 20% in 1970 to 140% in 1994.[49]

The first victim of the debt crisis was Mexico, which announced its insolvency in 1982, however, soon after it became clear that several of the developing countries were facing a similar situation.[50] By the mid ‘90s, the countries in the debt trap became excluded from the global financial system due to the debt burden which they could not ease.[51]

Since the debt crisis threatened the stability of the global financial system, the situation had to be addressed.[52] To do so, the IMF and the World Bank introduced the so-called structural adjustment loans in 1979. These loans with more favourable terms were used to replace the debts of the countries in crisis. The condition of disbursing the loan was that the country in question had to implement the economic policy reforms required by the two organisations.[53] These mostly comprised of the liberalisation of foreign trade and capital flows, deregulation and the drawing up of a stable and close-to-balance budget.[54] However, the (often criticised) structural adjustment loans failed to put an end to the unmanageable debt burden of the continent and the other countries trapped in this situation so the IMF and the World Bank launched the HIPC (heavily indebted poor countries) initiative in 1996,[55] in the framework of which the debt of 30 African countries was mostly cancelled by 2005.[56]

Many fear of a return of the crises in the ‘80s and ‘90s because of the current increase of Africa’s debt stock. However, analysts highlight two differences in the status quo, which were dealt with in more detail in the previous chapter. The first difference is that while the loans were mostly concessional and long-term at the end of the previous century, the current situation is more risky and unfavourable since most of the debt is market-based, which entails a higher interest rate and shorter term.[57]

The second major discrepancy is the creditor: by now, China has emerged as a primary creditor in the continent beside – or instead of – the traditional Western actors.[58] And as the primary consequence of the difference in the credit source, many are worried about the differing methods of managing the debt crisis: in the previous credit crisis, the major creditors were the IMF, the World Bank, and the Paris Club (comprising of the creditors of developed countries), which demanded certain economic reform from the borrowers in exchange for their help. The fears regarding China concern the possibility that the Asian country with increasing influence does not focus on good governance[59], so a potentially necessary crisis management would not follow the values of the West.

We must not forget, however, that the solutions that had been considered effective by the West did not meet expectations and caused major damages to the societies of the countries in the debt trap, under the flag of such values as market liberalisation or good governance that were considered universal. The practical results of the Neoliberal structural adjustment met with much criticism, primarily because the economic reforms took a heavy toll on the society: the minimalisation of the government role often led to the collapse of the health care and the education as well as to high unemployment rates among the qualified workers.[60] The IMF and the World Bank ignored the economic, social, political, and cultural characteristics of the individual countries,[61] and offered the reform measures that were successfully applied in the West as a universal solution in an entirely different context.

It is clear that the current debt situation is different in some aspects from the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s beyond the fact that we are not dealing with a debt crisis today. This is mostly the consequence of the context that has changed in the meantime, since China’s emergence as a significant creditor reflects well the shift of the geopolitical balance of power. Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that representing the status quo as “more dangerous” than the previous debt crisis is a narrative which is in the interest of the traditional players. Contrasting the credit levels, however, is insufficient for properly comparing the two periods: we also have to examine the causes which will follow in the next chapter.

Causes of the credit growth

Following the study of the tendencies of the African credit stock, this chapter explores the causes of the increase. Overall, the increased credit volume is promoted by factors both on the demand and the supply side. Having presented the general aspects, in this chapter, we will detail the factors behind China’s increasing role as a creditor.

Linked to the demand side, the first factor is the significant decrease in the African countries’ revenue, which is being caused by the sharp drop since 2014-2015 in the global prices of raw material which constitutes their major export item.[62] Between 2010 and 2014, Africa could produce an average annual GDP growth of 5% thanks to the high global prices of raw material.[63] Several of the world’s fastest growing economies operated in the continent.[64] From 2014-2015 on, however, prices dropped below the level at the global economic crisis.[65] Thus, governments needed and still need loans to continue to finance their budgets against declining revenues.[66]

This situation is very similar to the previous debt crisis, which shows that Africa’s vulnerable economic status as a raw material exporter, created as a result of colonisation, has not changed since the ‘80s and ‘90s and, in fact, since the colonial times. In other words, the historical roots of the continent’s indebtedness continue to exist.[67]

Also on the demand side, the second cause of the credit growth is the increasing of the development efforts of African governments, which primarily focus on infrastructure development and the investment environment.[68] A developed infrastructure is one of the prerequisites of the proper economic functioning, which could enable the continent’s low-income states to become middle-income countries.

This factor is also similar to the debt crisis of the late last century as the loans also aimed at the establishment of the necessary infrastructural systems after the states’ had become independent.

According to calculations by the African Development Bank, the development, operation and maintenance of the continent’s infrastructure would annually require USD 130-170 bn but the budget gap is 68-108 bn[69], or 93 bn according to the World Bank.[70] The affected governments offset the deficit by taking out loans.

China plays a decisive role in this as it has now become the largest bilateral financier of the continent’s infrastructural developments, overtaking actors such as the African Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the World Bank, and the G8.[71] The loans disbursed by China focus on infrastructure development, of over 3000 projects so far, for which the African states and public organisations annually received commercial loans of USD 6 bn in average between 2000 and 2014.[72]

The third cause behind the African credit growth is linked to the supply side. The interest rates were globally low and loans were cheap in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2008, so the investors focused on more risky investments in hope for a higher return.[73] The African economic growth caused by high raw material prices in the early 2010s meant a favourable investment environment for creditors since Africa had a return rate of 6% compared to 5,5% in emerging economies and 4% in the Asia-Pacific region.[74]

All this shows that the credit growth has multiple reasons but the main driver the increasing African demand. And this has several similarities to the reasons behind the emergence of the debt crisis at the end of the last century. Next, we must address the question as to why African states satisfy the increasing demand through Chinese loans in more and more instances.

The answer lies in the different relation of China and Africa compared to the traditional Western actors, which can be best summarised in the five principles of China’s African policy. This was emphasised last time by the Chinese Head of State Xi Jinping on the 7th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, held in September 2018, as a response to the criticism against the countries. In accordance with the five basic principles, that is the “five-no” approach, China does not interfere in African countries’ pursuit of development paths that fit their national conditions; does not interfere in African countries’ internal affairs; does not impose its will on them; does not attach political strings to the assistance to Africa; and does not seek selfish political gains in the investment and financing cooperation with Africa.[75]

China defines itself as a developing country and, in its interactions with African governments, places a great emphasis on appearing as a partner, rather than a superior expert of the continent’s problems or the only provider of the solutions to those problems. According to its rhetoric, the African problems had to be solved by African governments and people.[76] Another important dimension of the non-interference is that the Chinese loans and business opportunities are not linked to political[77] and economic policy conditions as is often the case with Western loans and aids. And this means a completely different experience for Africa. The Neoliberal economic reforms, i.e. the structural adjustment programmes that were the conditions for the Western loans have caused major damages to the continent, which ultimately led to a loss of trust in the African leadership, which, in turn, have more and more reservations about the proposed solutions offered by traditional partners.[78]

It is also important to point out that Chinese loans sometimes appear not as an alternative to the traditional Western creditors but as the only external financial source available. This is because countries with an unstable domestic policy and economic standing tend to have a low credit rating making it difficult for them to access external sources in the international financial markets. China, in contrast, is willing to lend money to countries such as Sudan.[79]

Primarily, these are the factors that led to the African actors’ positive perception of China, which allowed the Asian country’s role to be strengthened in the continent. Following the presentation of the African perspective, it is also worth to look at what motivates China to strengthen the economic relations with the black continent.

China’s interests

It is true that, in accordance with the policy of non-interference, China does not set (economic policy and) political conditions for loans, it does determine business conditions, for which the country ha been often criticised. The condition of loans given by China for infrastructure developments is usually that the contracting company has to be Chinese.[80] This is important to them because this way the Chinese and often state-owned companies gain employment opportunities, and in an international environment at that, which also boosts their competitiveness through collecting experience.[81] However, this concept often makes the African party concerned since this means that the states accumulate debt towards China while the Asian party practically finances its own companies.[82]

The other side of this process is that Chinese loans disbursed in line with such conditions leave no chance for corruption or spending them on goals other than those specified in the contract as these amounts do not even “enter” Africa but circulate within the Chinese financial system.[83]

Depending on the African party’s capacity to assert its own interests, the contracts might also stipulate the rate of African locals among the contractors. The number of Africans is usually much lower than that of Chinese contractors but increasing their rate has barriers not only because of Chinese economic interests but also due to the lack of qualified work force. (Angola, for example, also offers an example for this.[84]) The question is whether such credit conditions enhance or rather impede the growth of local expertise and knowledge. On the hand, the African actors cooperating with the effective Chinese contractors can learn new skills, on the other hand, they have a competitive disadvantage against the Chinese party in their own country.

Partly linked to this previous factor, another advantage of the loans offered by China to Africa is that they open the door for Chinese businesses as a sort of indirect consequence. The Chinese economic and credit agreements send the message to the market participants that the Asian country is committed to long-term economic cooperation, thereby creating a foundation on which the private sector actors can build on with confidence: they can invest or start a business,[85] which, in general, contributes to the strengthening of the Chinese economy. This is also confirmed by a McKinsey research which shows that around 10,000 Chinese businesses currently operate in the continent, 90% of which is privately owned.[86]

The usually identified next factor behind the Chinese lending is that the Asian country tries to secure the necessary raw materials through its loans. This can occur in several ways: for example, the country accepts raw material as a security for the loans,[87] obtains a share in the project in exchange for realising the infrastructure development, or the credit repayment can take place in raw material instead of money. This option is favourable to African states that have a low credit rating and a lack of resources and the infrastructural investments necessary for their development could not be realised otherwise. China does not apply a uniform “method” for such transactions, the agreements differ on a case-by-case basis.[88]

The “raw material in exchange for credit” scheme is in line with the logic of the Chinese-African trade relations. China satisfies its huge demand for raw material primarily from external sources, which it tries to diversify for strategic reasons. Therefore, it considers Africa an important exporter of raw material and natural resources. Furthermore, since 2009 China has been the largest partner of the black continent in terms of the total value of the trade volume.[89] By product structure, their trade partnership is characterised by imbalance: Africa exports primarily raw material and natural resources to China, and it imports mainly manufactured goods from its partner.[90]

It is important to point out, however, that the “raw material in exchange for credit” scheme is not applied for every loan since China have access to the region’s raw material under market conditions as well. Between 2000 and 2014, 33% of Chinese loans were such resource-based transactions.[91]

The fourth reason[92] why China is eager to grant loans to the black continent is that Africa’s infrastructural development also positively affects the Asian country on the one hand because it accelerates the exploitation of raw material vital to China, and on the other hand because the improved infrastructure enables the Chinese goods to reach bigger markets increasingly faster and more effectively.[93]

Some analysts mention a fifth factor: by ensuring that debts are repaid in some form – be it through economic concessions or other agreements –, China strives to establish a new type of diplomatic relation with Africa in the long term, thereby increasing its geopolitical influence in the continent.[94] This is also one of the main accusations against China. However, we have to take into consideration two aspects.

First, it is important to make it clear that both international aids and official loans are regarded as foreign policy instruments. And it is the aim of nations to create more favourable conditions for themselves during their domestic and foreign policy-making. In other words, protecting their own interests is a decisive factor when applying diplomatic instruments. This is true for China just as it is for Western countries. So China – or any other state – is interested in making transactions that are beneficial to the country as well. The only difference between the Chinese and the Western foreign policy narrative is that the former openly emphasises the importance of seeking win-win solutions.

Another important aspect is that the main pillar of the Chinese-African relations is the policy of non-interference, in lie of which China has declared not to intervene in the partner country’s domestic affairs.[95] That is partly why it has become a popular partner for Africans as opposed to traditional Western actors.

Taking into account all of the above, we can conclude based on the official narratives that the accusations against China of trying to gain political influence are not true, while the claims in terms of disguised self-interest hold true in so far as they would for any other foreign power.

The possibility, however, of China trying to force the African economies into an impossible situation through loans can be excluded. Indeed, a dysfunctional economy excluded from the global financial system could not offer China such business opportunities as described above. A thriving African economy means an increasing demand for Chinese products and services and a more certain investment environment for Chinese market participants.

Conclusion

The present research sought and answer to the question whether China pursues a debt trap diplomacy vis-á-vis African countries. This concept was explained as the phenomenon that China aims to increase its influence in the continent by trying to make African nations insolvent through granting large loans and then demanding rights and privileges in exchange for easing the debt burden.

In order to provide an answer to the question, first, we described the current credit status in more detail, which suggested that although the continent’s debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the threshold set by the IMF, some analysts say that there is no risk of the emergence of a new debt crisis. Moreover, the continental average is made up of significantly different national rates so, in particular, Africa collectively plunging into a debt trap is currently not apparent.

The examination made it clear that although China has by now become a major actor in the continent, it would be false to state that it is Africa’s exclusive or even greatest creditor.

The study of the causes of the African credit growth suggested that there are multiple factors at play – both on the demand and the supply side –, therefore, China cannot be made solely responsible for the continent’s current indebtedness. All the more so because these causes are very similar to that of the debt crisis in the ‘80s and ‘90s so, in other words, the historical roots of the continent’s indebtedness continue to exist.[96] Africa did not succeed in recovering from its vulnerable economic status – created as a result of colonisation – as a raw material exporter over the past couple of decades.

Two conclusions follow from this: first, since the economic roles causing the previous crisis have not changed, there is a real threat that this will occur again. Second, if this happens again, China will not be exclusively responsible for the debt crisis, it is rather the historical heritage of the former colonisers that is to blame, who, in line with their economic interests, integrated the continent in the world economy as a source of basic material and market outlet, which has since not been able to take a major step ahead in the production chain.

The study, furthermore, highlighted the fact the increase of Chinese loans had been actually grounded on the proposed Western solution. After these failed, the continent’s countries preferred to turn to a business partner that does not link the granting of loans to (economic) policy conditions. Nevertheless, traditional donors continue to be key creditors in the continent. Their multilateral and bilateral players combined still exceed the weight of China.

However, the downsides of the Chinese loans should also be reckoned with: the business term of the loans are good examples. The fact that China often grants loans for infrastructure developments only if the constructions can be carried out by Chinese companies or that the credit facilities sometimes include the raw material supplies of the recipient country (for example as security) can have mixed effects in the long term. This preserve Africa’s role as a raw material source, which still leads to its vulnerable situation. A way forward, however, is presented by the possibility that these states manage to make progress in the global production chains thanks to the infrastructure developments, financed, inter alia, by Chinese loans.

The analysis shows that China also has clearly identified interests in granting loans to Africa. While critical voices say that it is in the interest of the Asian country to force the continent’s countries into crisis, a closer economic cooperation with a thriving Africa better represents China’s long-term interests – not to mention the fact that it would lose its credits in case of insolvency.

There is, of course, the risk that an eventual insolvency would negatively affect the country in question, in which case China, just as any other creditor, would enforce the agreement concluded between them. It is important to see that the African states are sovereign countries which decide for themselves from where and under which terms they wish to take out loans. For instance, a non-remunerative prestige investment can cause serious economic damage, the price of which is usually borne by the people, rather than the decision makers. Thus, it is the responsibility of African leaders – and the properly functioning check and balances – to take out essential and beneficial credits, as it is the case with better performing states.

All of this leads to the conclusion that the “debt trap diplomacy” narrative, defined in the analysis, rather reflects Western states’ growing concerns about China. The objective evaluation of the African debt status requires a much more nuanced analytical framework which takes into account multiple factors.

Author: Ráhel Czirják

REFERENCES
Notes:

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[5] SCHNEIDMAN, Witney – WIEGERT, Joel: Competing in Africa: China, the European Union, and the United States. In: Brooking, 16 Apr. 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/04/16/competing-in-africa-china-the-european-union-and-the-united-states/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[6] World Bank Group: International Debt Statistics 2019. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/30851/IDS2019.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[7] World Bank data: International Debt Statistics, https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/international-debt-statistics (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[8] World Bank data: Debt Data, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/debt/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[9] World Bank Group: International Debt Statistics 2019.  https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/30851/IDS2019.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y  (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[10] Ibid.

[11] IMF: Assessing Sustainability. 28 May 2002,  https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sus/2002/eng/052802.pdf  (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[12] SOW, Mariama: Figures of the week: Africa’s changing debt structure. In: Brookings, 26 Apr. 2018,https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/04/26/figures-of-the-week-africas-changing-debt-structure/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[13] African Development Bank Group: African Economic Outloook 2019. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/AEO_2019-EN.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[14] African Development Bank Group: African Economic Outloook 2019. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/AEO_2019-EN.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[15] GILL, Indermit – KARAKÜLAH, Kenan: Sounding the alarm on Africa’s debt. In: Brookings, 6 Apr. 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/04/06/sounding-the-alarm-on-africas-debt/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[16] African Development Bank Group: African Economic Outloook 2019. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/AEO_2019-EN.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[17] IMF: Assessing Sustainability. 28 May 2002,  https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sus/2002/eng/052802.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[18] World Bank: Country and Lending Groups. https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[19] African Development Bank Groups: African Economic Outlook 2018 https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/African_Economic_Outlook_2018_-_EN.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[20] Economist: Debt is creeping back in sub-Saharan Africa. 13 Mar. 2018, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/03/13/debt-is-creeping-back-up-in-sub-saharan-africa (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[21] MADOWO, Larry: Should Africa be wary of Chinese debt? In: BBC News, 3 Sept. 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45368092 (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[22] Ibid.

[23] African Development Bank Groups: African Economic Outlook 2018 https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/African_Economic_Outlook_2018_-_EN.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[24] Economist: Zambia’s looming debt crisis is a warning for the rest of Africa. 15 Sept. 2018) https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/09/15/zambias-looming-debt-crisis-is-a-warning-for-the-rest-of-africa (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[25] African Development Bank Group: African Economic Outloook 2019. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/AEO_2019-EN.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[26] African Development Bank Groups: African Economic Outlook 2018 https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/African_Economic_Outlook_2018_-_EN.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[27] World Bank data: International Debt Statistics, https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/international-debt-statistics (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[28] African Development Bank Group: African Economic Outloook 2019. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/AEO_2019-EN.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[29] GEDA, Alemayehu: The Historical Origin of African Debt Crisis. In: Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review. Vol. 19, Number 1. Jan. 2003. pp. 59-89.

[30]  https://jubileedebt.org.uk/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Briefing_09.18.pdf  (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[31] GEDA, Alemayehu: The Historical Origin of African Debt Crisis. In: Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review. Vol. 19, Number 1. Jan. 2003. 65.

[32]  https://jubileedebt.org.uk/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Briefing_09.18.pdf  (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[33] GEDA, Alemayehu: The Historical Origin of African Debt Crisis. In: Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review. Vol. 19, Number 1. Jan. 2003. 65.

[34] Jubilee Debt Campaign: Africa’s growing debt crisis: Who is the debt owed to? Oct. 2018.  https://jubileedebt.org.uk/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Briefing_09.18.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[35] Ibid.

[36] African Development Bank Group: African Economic Outloook 2019. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/AEO_2019-EN.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[37] Jubilee Debt Campaign: Africa’s growing debt crisis: Who is the debt owed to? Oct. 2018.  https://jubileedebt.org.uk/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Briefing_09.18.pdf   (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019) ; Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative:  http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-loans-and-aid-to-africa  (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[38] SCHNEIDMAN, Witney – WIEGERT, Joel: Competing in Africa: China, the European Union, and the United States. In: Brooking, 16 Apr. 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/04/16/competing-in-africa-china-the-european-union-and-the-united-states/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[39] Jubilee Debt Campaign: Africa’s growing debt crisis: Who is the debt owed to? Oct. 2018.  https://jubileedebt.org.uk/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Briefing_09.18.pdf   (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[40] Ibid.

[41] SCHNEIDMAN, Witney – WIEGERT, Joel: Competing in Africa: China, the European Union, and the United States. In: Brooking, 16 Apr. 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/04/16/competing-in-africa-china-the-european-union-and-the-united-states/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[42] Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative:  http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-loans-and-aid-to-africa  (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[43] MUTAMBO, Aggrey: Are China’s financial dealings in Africa a debt tra por bailout? In: Daily Nation, 23 Sept. 2018, https://www.nation.co.ke/news/China-in-Africa-debt-trap-or-bailout/1056-4773650-102xpw5z/index.html (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[44] Ibid.

[45] African Development Bank Group: African Economic Outloook 2019. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/AEO_2019-EN.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[46] GEDA, Alemayehu: The Historical Origin of African Debt Crisis. In: Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review. Vol. 19, Number 1. Jan. 2003. pp. 59-89.

[47]FRIEDMAN, George – SNYDER, Xander: How China Benefits from African Debt. In: Geopolitical Futures, 29 Jan. 2018, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/china-benefits-african-debt/(Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[48] GEDA, Alemayehu: The Historical Origin of African Debt Crisis. In: Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review. Vol. 19, Number 1. Jan. 2003. pp. 59-89.

[49] MOORE, Gyude: The language of „debt-trap diplomacy” reflects Western anxieties, not African realities. In: Quartz, 17 Sept. 2018, https://qz.com/1391770/the-anxious-chorus-around-chinese-debt-trap-diplomacy-doesnt-reflect-african-realities/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[50] BRAUTIGAM, Deborah – KNACK, Stephen: Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-saharan Africa. In: Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2004, 52.2. pp. 255-285.

[51] Economist: Debt is creeping back in sub-Saharan Africa. 13 Mar. 2018, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/03/13/debt-is-creeping-back-up-in-sub-saharan-africa (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[52] MOYO, Dambisa: Dead aid. 2010 New York, 208.

[53] EASTERLY, William: Are Aid Agencies improving? 2007, Brookings Institution, 47.

[54] SZENT-IVÁNYI, Balázs: Political Economy of International Development Cooperation (A nemzetközi fejlesztési együttműködés politikai gazdaságtana). In: Kül-Világ, 2005, 2. 4. pp. 29-45.

[55] GEDA, Alemayehu: The Historical Origin of African Debt Crisis. In: Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review. Vol. 19, Number 1. Jan. 2003. pp. 59-89.

[56] Economist: Zambia’s looming debt crisis is a warning for the rest of Africa. 15 Sept. 2018) https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/09/15/zambias-looming-debt-crisis-is-a-warning-for-the-rest-of-africa (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[57] GILES, Chris – PILLING, David: African nations slipping into new debt crisis. In: Financial Times,19 Apr. 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/baf01b06-4329-11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019); FRIEDMAN, George – SNYDER, Xander: How China Benefits from African Debt. In: Geopolitical Futures, 29 Jan. 2018, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/china-benefits-african-debt/(Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[58] FRIEDMAN, George – SNYDER, Xander: How China Benefits from African Debt. In: Geopolitical Futures, 29 Jan. 2018, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/china-benefits-african-debt/(Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[59] Economist: Zambia’s looming debt crisis is a warning for the rest of Africa. 15 Sept. 2018) https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/09/15/zambias-looming-debt-crisis-is-a-warning-for-the-rest-of-africa (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[60] DE WAAL, Alex: Democratizing the aid encounter in Africa. In: International Affairs, 1997. 73.4. pp. 632-639.

[61] PARAGI, Beáta et al.: Text-book on International Aid Development (Nemzetközi fejlesztési segélyezés tankönyv). TeTT Consult Kft. Budapest, 2007. p. 238.

[62] Economist: Debt is creeping back in sub-Saharan Africa. 13 Mar. 2018, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/03/13/debt-is-creeping-back-up-in-sub-saharan-africa (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[63] IGHOROB, Kingsley: Commodity prices crash hits Africa. In: Africa renewal, March 2017, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2016-march-2017/commodity-prices-crash-hits-africa (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[64] Ibid.

[65] SANDERSON, henry et al.: Explainer: Why commodities have crashed. In: Financial Times, 24 Aug. 2015,  https://www.ft.com/content/459ef70a-4a43-11e5-b558-8a9722977189  (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[66] Economist: Debt is creeping back in sub-Saharan Africa. 13 Mar. 2018, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/03/13/debt-is-creeping-back-up-in-sub-saharan-africa (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[67] GEDA, Alemayehu: The Historical Origin of African Debt Crisis. In: Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review. Vol. 19, Number 1. Jan. 2003. pp. 59-89.

[68] WERE, Anzetse: Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options. In: South African Institute of International Affairs, Policy Insights 66., August 2018, https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/sai_spi_66_were_20190910.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[69] African Development Bank Group: African Economic Outloook 2019. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/AEO_2019-EN.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[70] World Bank: Africa’s Infrastructure. 2010, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/246961468003355256/pdf/521020PUB0EPI1101Official0Use0Only1.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[71] MADOWO, Larry: Should Africa be wary of Chinese debt? In: BBC News, 3 Sept. 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45368092 (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[72] SCHNEIDMAN, Witney – WIEGERT, Joel: Competing in Africa: China, the European Union, and the United States. In: Brooking, 16 Apr. 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/04/16/competing-in-africa-china-the-european-union-and-the-united-states/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[73] FRIEDMAN, George – SNYDER, Xander: How China Benefits from African Debt. In: Geopolitical Futures, 29 Jan. 2018, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/china-benefits-african-debt/(Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[74] SOW, Mariama: Figures of the week: Africa’s changing debt structure. In: Brookings, 26 Apr. 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/04/26/figures-of-the-week-africas-changing-debt-structure/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[75] XINHUA: Full text of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech at opening ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit (1). 6 Sept. 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_137441987.htm (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[76] WERE, Anzetse: Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options. In: South African Institute of International Affairs, Policy Insights 66., August 2018, https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/sai_spi_66_were_20190910.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[77] In contrast to the Chinese rhetoric, however, experience shows that the condition for the Chinese economic cooperation is that the African states recognise the People’s Republic of China as the official representative of China, as opposed to Taiwan.

[78] HEIDHUES F – G OBARE, ‘Lessons from structural adjustment programmes and their effects in Africa’, Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, 50, 1, 2011, pp. 55-64.

[79] Middle East Monitor: Chinese investment in Sudan oil hits 15bn USD. 26 Aug. 2017,  https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170826-chinese-investment-in-sudan-oil-hits-15bn/  (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[80] ESZTERHAI, Viktor: The past, present and future of guanxi – an alternative Chinese foreign policy model (A guanxi múltja, jelene, jövője – egy alternatív kínai külpolitikai modell). 2017, doctoral thesis.

[81] Ibid.

[82] WERE, Anzetse: Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options. In: South African Institute of International Affairs, Policy Insights 66., August 2018, https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/sai_spi_66_were_20190910.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[83] ESZTERHAI, Viktor: The past, present and future of guanxi – an alternative Chinese foreign policy model (A guanxi múltja, jelene, jövője – egy alternatív kínai külpolitikai modell). 2017, doctoral thesis.

[84] Ibid.

[85] SU, Xiaochen: Why Chinese infrastructure loans in Africa Represent a brand-new type of neocolonialism. In: The Diplomat, 9 Jun. 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/why-chinese-infrastructural-loans-in-africa-represent-a-brand-new-type-of-neocolonialism/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[86] Economist: China goes to Africa. 20 Jul. 2017,  https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/07/20/china-goes-to-africa   (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[87] SUN, Yun: China’s aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah? In: Brookings, 7 Feb. 2014,  https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[88] FRIEDMAN, George – SNYDER, Xander: How China Benefits from African Debt. In: Geopolitical Futures, 29 Jan. 2018, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/china-benefits-african-debt/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[89] PILLING, David – HORNBY, Lucy: China pledges 60 bn USD for Africa as Xi rejects ’debt trap’ claims. In: Financial Times, 3 Sept. 2018,  https://www.ft.com/content/e46bf2e2-af90-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132  (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[90] CZIRJÁK, Ráhel – POLYÁK, Eszter – SIMIGH, Fruzsina: In the shadow of the Dragon – Will China recolonise Africa? (A Sárkány árnyékában – Kína újragyarmatosítja Afrikát?). In: Geopolitika.hu, 18 Dec. 2015,  http://www.geopolitika.hu/hu/2015/12/18/a-sarkany-arnyekaban-kina-ujragyarmatositja-afrikat/  (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[91] FRIEDMAN, George – SNYDER, Xander: How China Benefits from African Debt. In: Geopolitical Futures, 29 Jan. 2018, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/china-benefits-african-debt/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[92] WERE, Anzetse: Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options. In: South African Institute of International Affairs, Policy Insights 66., August 2018, https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/sai_spi_66_were_20190910.pdf (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[93] SU, Xiaochen: Why Chinese infrastructure loans in Africa Represent a brand-new type of neocolonialism. In: The Diplomat, 9 Jun. 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/why-chinese-infrastructural-loans-in-africa-represent-a-brand-new-type-of-neocolonialism/ (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[94] Ibid.

[95] CZIRJÁK, Ráhel – POLYÁK, Eszter – SIMIGH, Fruzsina: In the shadow of the Dragon – Will China recolonise Africa? (A Sárkány árnyékában – Kína újragyarmatosítja Afrikát?). In: Geopolitika.hu, 18 Dec. 2015,  http://www.geopolitika.hu/hu/2015/12/18/a-sarkany-arnyekaban-kina-ujragyarmatositja-afrikat/  (Downloaded: 15 Feb. 2019)

[96] GEDA, Alemayehu: The Historical Origin of African Debt Crisis. In: Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review. Vol. 19, Number 1. Jan. 2003. pp. 59-89.

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